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A. Introduction
Corporate law provides for a transaction commonly referred to as “spin-off”. The
corporate enterprise is divided in (at least) two corporations. The stock of a controlled
subsidiary will be distributed pro rata by a parent corporation to its shareholders which
end up owning a brother/sister pair of corporate enterprises.

The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) in § 355 provides special rules for the distribution of stock and securities of a controlled corporation. The transaction is known as a “D
reorganization”, if such a distribution follows the transfer by a corporation of all or a part
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of its assets to another corporation, § 368(a)(D) IRC. If the requirements of these sections
are met, the Code allows tax free treatment on corporate as well as shareholder level.

The rules of § 355 IRC are rather complicated and give rise to an ongoing discussion on how to amend the Code to make the law less complex. The basic idea behind
these provisions is to prevent tax avoidance schemes. In the context of § 355 IRC two
principal concerns might be the driving forces: spin-offs could be used (1) to convert
ordinary dividend income at the shareholder level into capital gain, and (2) to transfer
appreciated property out of the corporation without triggering tax on the corporate level
(“circumvent the purposes of General Utilities repeal”). Whether the current rules on the
background of these concerns are convincing or amendments should be suggested will be
discussed in this paper.

It might be helpful to compare the current U.S. law to the German tax code.
German corporate law provides for a similar transaction referred to as “Abspaltung”. This
corporate transaction allows the transfer of part of the assets of a corporation to a new or
existing other corporation in exchange for stock in this corporation transferred directly to
the shareholders of the transferor corporation. From a corporate perspective the results
are the same as in case of a “D reorganization” within § 368(a)(D) IRC. § 15 German
Transformation Tax Act( “Umwandlungssteuergesetz” – UmwStG) provides for tax free
treatment on corporate and shareholder level, if its requirements are met. Although the
requirements are similar to those of § 355 IRC they differ in part. Particularly § 15 (3)
UmwStG, which contains a provision disallowing the transfer of stock of corporations
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taking part in the Abspaltung to third parties, might present new arguments to the
discussion whether the current rules of § 355 IRC, especially the “device” rule and
§ 355(d), and (e) IRC, should be retained or amendments seem necessary.

The paper will describe the U.S. and German tax provisions. The advantages and
disadvantages of the national rules will be discussed. This might give rise to the conclusion that part of the U.S. rules should be implemented in German tax law or vice versa.

B. U.S. law
I. Basic understanding of spin-off transactions
1. Spin-off transactions – definition and business reasons
a) Definition of spin-off transactions
A corporate enterprise can engage in different businesses. From a corporate law
point of view there is no need to incorporate several independent corporations. Nevertheless, a division of such a multidivisional corporation might be desirable. If the only
purpose of such a separation of businesses is to insulate the remaining corporate enterprise from the potential liabilities of risky operations, the creation of a subsidiary might
be sufficient.1 However, often the desired objective can be accomplished only if the
shares of an existing or newly created subsidiary corporation are distributed by the parent

1

Provided the structure does not trigger a piercing of the corporate veil. See for New York law Walkovsky
v. Carlton, 18 N.Y. 2d 414 (1966); parent-subsidiary context: Bernardin, Inc. v. Midland Oil Corp., 520
F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1975).
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corporation to (some or all of) its shareholders. Typically, this latter type of transaction is
referred to as “division of the corporation”.2

The division of a corporation can be structured in different ways. Generally, the
corporate divisions might be accomplished in three forms: (1) the spin-off as the “basic”
form of corporate division in which shares of an existing or newly created subsidiary
corporation are distributed to shareholders as a dividend; (2) the split-off in which the
subsidiary stock is transferred to some of the parent’s shareholders in exchange for their
parent stock; and (3) the split-up in which the parent corporation is liquidated and its
assets are distributed to its shareholders.3

It is up to the corporation to select the form best suited to its business purposes.4
The paper will focus on the spin-off as the basic form of corporate division. Other forms
of corporate divisions (i.e. split-off and split-up) will be discussed in the context of
separation of shareholder groups.

b) Business reasons for divisive transactions
A divisive transaction might serve several purposes. One reason often stated is the
possibility to insulate liabilities of different businesses.5 As mentioned above,6 this goal

2

See Solomon, White on New York Corporations, Part I, § 6.01.

3

Cf. Solomon, White on New York Corporations, Part I, § 6.03; Howley, Business Organizations with Tax
Planning, Part 23, § 150.03.

4

Howley, Business Organizations with Tax Planning, Part 23, § 150.03.

5

Howley, Business Organizations with Tax Planning, Part 23, § 150.02 [2].

6

Under B.I.1.a).
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can be accomplished without spinning off the stock of a subsidiary to the parent’s shareholders – generally the formation of a subsidiary is sufficient.7 Stated from an investor
perspective, the spin-off by the parent corporation of riskier operations gives shareholders
the opportunity to decide on their own whether they want to stay invested in more
speculative businesses or not. A listing of “one-division” corporations allows investors to
decide in which business to invest – this might result in a higher valuation of the parts
after corporate division.8

If Antitrust considerations or government regulation require a division of the
corporate entity, a spin-off might be the best solution. The mere formation of a subsidiary
will not be sufficient in these cases.9

Dividing the corporation allows to dispose unwanted assets in a tax-free sale. An
acquirer might be interested only in one of several businesses. To achieve an acquisition
via tax-free merger the target business has to be spun-off first.10 Notably, § 355 IRC
contains limitation with respect to these pre-sale or pre- acquisition transactions. The
same applies to spin-offs which shall facilitate the sale of assets without paying tax on the
corporate level. This result generally could be achieved by transferring the assets into a
7

See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(5), Example (3); Solomon, White on New York Corporations, Part I, § 6.02
[2].

8

Howley, Business Organizations with Tax Planning, Part 23, § 150.02 [2]; Solomon, White on New York
Corporations, Part I, § 6.02 [4]; Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation,
5.E., Ch. 10 A.2.
9

Cf. Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966); Fox/Fox, Corporate Acquisitions and
Mergers, Part 2, § 4.09 [1].
10

Cf. Solomon, White on New York Corporations, Part I, § 6.02 [3].
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newly created corporation (NewCo) and then spinning off NewCo’s stock to the parent’s
shareholders. If § 355 IRC would not provide for limitations, the shareholders could
realize the value of the assets by just selling the distributed stock instead of the corporation selling the assets and the gain realized being distributed to the shareholders.

Divisive transactions allow the separation of shareholder groups.11 If the shareholders of the transferor corporation are no longer able to solve their conflicts or the
decision process is too time consuming, the corporation can no longer compete successfully. If the existing shareholder groups wish to continue parts of the business in a
corporate form, a divisive reorganization seems to be the solution. Typically such a
separation of shareholder groups will be accomplished by a split-off.12

2. Spin-off transactions under U.S. corporate law
To divide a corporation by means of a spin-off as the “basic” form of corporate
division, the shares of an existing or newly created subsidiary corporation are distributed
to shareholders as a dividend. A two-step approach is needed, if no subsidiary exists.
Initially, the transferor corporation would cause a NewCo to be formed and then transfer
at least one business to NewCo in exchange for all of NewCo’s outstanding stock. The
corporate law requirements for this transfer are identical with those for any formation of a
corporation.13 In a second step, the transferor corporation would distribute the subsidiary

11

See Howley, Business Organizations with Tax Planning, Part 23, § 150.02 [1]; Solomon, White on New
York Corporations, Part I, § 6.02 [1].

12

Fox/Fox, Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers, Part 2, § 4.09 [1].

13

Solomon, White on New York Corporations, Part I, § 6.01, Fn. 2.
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stock to its shareholders as a dividend in kind. To this dividend the same corporate law
limitations as to any other dividend apply.14

If a split-off is desired, the same steps described above would be taken except that
the subsidiary stock is transferred only to some of the transferor corporation’s shareholders and the distribution of the subsidiary stock is in exchange for the transferor
corporation’s own outstanding stock. Corporate law requirements of transactions by a
corporation with respect to its own shares apply to this purchase of own stock by the
transferor corporation.15

It should be mentioned that a registration under the Securities Act of 1933 might
be necessary, if the transferor corporation’s shares are listed on a public market. In this
case the distributed stock of the subsidiary ends up to be held by the shareholders of the
transferor corporation, i.e. the investing public.16

II. U.S. corporate tax regime
1. General corporate tax regime
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provides under Subchapter C for a double
taxation of distributed corporate earnings.17 The income is taxed first on the corporate

14

E.g. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 510 (no insolvency, out of surplus); see Solomon, White on New York
Corporations, Part I, § 6.03 [1].

15

For New York law cf. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 513 (e.g. no insolvency, correct purchase price); Solomon,
White on New York Corporations, Part I, § 6.03 [1].

16

Cf. Fox/Fox, Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers, Part 5, § 23.02 [3]. See also Rule 145 of Securities
Act of 1933.

17

This is not true for corporations taxed under Subchapter S (§§ 1361-1378 IRC). However, the paper will
focus on the general principles of the taxation of corporations laid out in Subchapter C.
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level and taxed a second time when distributed to the shareholders. The applicable tax
rate on the corporate level is 35%.18 Generally, the tax rate of the shareholders is determined in accordance with §§ 1 (a)-(d), 11 IRC, which ever is applicable. However, the
tax burden for corporations is reduced by the dividend-received deduction.19 For
individual taxpayers, starting in 2003, the tax rate for dividends has been significantly
lowered. Qualified dividends received by individual shareholders are taxed at the same
rates that apply to net capital gain.20

If the shareholder sells the corporation’s shares, the shareholder has to include the
difference of the amount realized and the adjusted basis in taxable income.21 This gain is
not taxed as ordinary income, but rather in accordance with the tax rates on capital gains
under § 1 (h) IRC, provided the shares have been held by the individual taxpayer for
more than one year.22 The preferential treatment of capital gains might encourage structuring transactions to receive a capital gains treatment rather than including the items in
ordinary income. This is especially true with respect to spin-off transactions.23

18

For details see § 11 (b) IRC

19

Cf. § 243 IRC.

20

See new § 1 (h)(11) IRC, enacted by Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, May 28,
2003. The Act also provides for a sunset provision according to which the reduced tax rates expire, and
regular tax rates apply to tax years beginning after December 31, 2008.

21

Cf. § 1001 (a) IRC.

22

Regarding the applicable tax rates see new § 1 (h) IRC, as amended by Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003, May 28, 2003. Cf. § 1221 IRC defining capital asset and Bielfeldt v.
Commissioner, 231 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 2000) for the distinction between ordinary and capital income with
respect to securities. For corporations a 35% tax rate on capital gains applies, cf. § 1201 (a) IRC.
23

See B.III. for details.
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2. Consolidated group
A group of corporations related through one “parent” corporation holding directly
or indirectly at least 80% of the other group members (so called “affiliated group”)24 may
elect to file a consolidated tax return treating the group as a single unit for tax purposes.25
Once the election is made for a taxable year, the group members must continue to file on
a consolidated basis unless the IRS consents to a termination or the common parent
corporation is no longer in existence.26

The affiliated group is treated as a single unit for tax purposes. Accordingly, the
tax liability is computed based on dealings with third parties outside the affiliated group.
Transactions within the group have to be eliminated.27 As an important advantage, losses
of one group member can be used to offset income of profitable members of the affiliated
group28 with certain limitations.29

24

Cf. § 1504 IRC.

25

See § 1501 IRC.

26

Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 11.07; Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg,
Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 13 B.2.b.

27

Cf. Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 11.07 (d); Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 13 B.3; for details.

28

Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 13 B.5;
Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 11.07 (g).
29

See Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 11.07 (g), describing several limitations
according to the Treasury Regulations § 1-1502, e.g. rules based on §§ 381, 382 IRC disallowing loss
deductions in case of the acquisition of a corporation with “built-in” losses.
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III. Taxation of Spin-offs
1. Overview
There are several legitimate business reasons to pursue a corporate division. The
purpose of § 355 IRC is to allow such business driven corporate divisions without
triggering taxes on corporate or shareholder level.30

In accordance with this rationale, non-recognition treatment shall be available to
transactions which merely change the form of the business without changing the
ownership.31 Divisive reorganizations not serving a legitimate business reason will be
taxable. Typically, spin-offs are utilized (1) to convert ordinary dividend income at the
shareholder level into capital gain, and (2) to transfer appreciated property out of the
corporation without triggering tax on the corporate level. The requirements of § 355 IRC
are designed to differentiate between corporate divisions primarily aimed to realize the
tax benefits of § 355 IRC and those with valid business reasons.

To achieve tax free treatment of the divisive transaction under the Code, the taxpayers have to comply with the complicated provision § 355 IRC as well as judicial
requirements.32 First, the distributing corporation must be in “control” of the existing or –
in case of a “D reorganization” under § 368 (a)(1)(D) IRC – newly created subsidiary the

30

Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 A.4.

31

Schler, Simplifying and Rationalizing the Spinoff Rules, 56 SMU L. Rev. 239 (247), citing Staff of
J. Comm. On Tax’n, 100th Congress, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (“1986 Blue
Book”), at 337.
32

For the following see Fox/Fox, Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers, Part 2, § 4.09 [2]. Lind/
Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 A.4.a.
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stock of which is transferred.33 Second, the transferor corporation must distribute at least
sufficient stock to constitute control under § 368 (c) IRC to its shareholders.34 Third, both
the distributing corporation and the controlled corporation must be engaged in the “active
conduct of a trade or business” immediately after the distribution and for a 5-year period
preceding the transaction.35 Fourth, the transaction is not used principally as a device for
the distribution of earnings and profits.36 Additional judicial limitations apply: nonrecognition is available only if the divisive transaction is carried out for an independent
corporate business purpose and the shareholders of the enterprise prior to the division
maintain adequate continuity of interest in the corporation taking part in the transaction
after the distribution.37

A transaction under § 355 IRC need not be part of a reorganization.38 However, if
the distributing corporation initially transfers part of its assets to a newly-formed
subsidiary corporation the stock of which will be distributed, the transaction as a whole
will constitute a divisive “D reorganization” under § 368 (a)(1)(D) IRC.39 According to

33

§ 355 (a)(1)(A) IRC.

34

§ 355 (a)(1)(D) IRC.

35

§ 355 (a)(1)(C) with (b) IRC.

36

§ 355 (a)(1)(B) IRC.

37

See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b), (c).

38

Cf. § 355 (a)(2)(C) IRC.

39

Provided that the requirements of a reorganization are met: (1) a reorganization within § 368 (a)(1) IRC
takes place, (2) the exchange is made in accordance with the plan of reorganization, and (3) the parties to
the exchange are parties to the reorganization within § 368 (b) IRC, or shareholders or security holders of a
party to the reorganization; see Calvitch, Business Organizations with Tax Planning, Part 26, Ch. 176.01
[1]-[4]; Schler, Simplifying and Rationalizing the Spinoff Rules, 56 SMU L. Rev. 239 (242).
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§ 361 (a) IRC, the transferor corporation will recognize no gain or loss on the asset transfer if the transfer is solely in exchange for stock. The basis of the assets transferred will
generally be the same for the new subsidiary corporation as in the hands of the transferor
corporation.40 Earnings and profits of the transferor corporation are apportioned between
the transferor and the transferee corporation,41 but § 381 IRC, providing for carryover of
net operating loss, does not apply.42 For the whole reorganization to receive the tax free
treatment, the second step of the reorganization – the distribution of the NewCo’s stock –
must qualify under § 355 IRC.43

2. Statutory and judicial requirements of § 355 IRC
a) Control requirement
The corporation – in case of a “D reorganization”– transferring the assets to a
newly formed subsidiary and distributing the stock must distribute to its shareholders the
shares of a corporation which “it controls immediately before the distribution”.44
“Control”, for this purpose, means ownership of at least 80% of the combined voting
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote, and at least 80% of the number of shares of

40

See § 362 (b) IRC.

41

Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 D.3.

42

Cf. § 381 (a), (c) IRC; Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E.,
Ch. 10 D.3.
43

According to § 368 (a)(1)(D) IRC the stock must be distributed in a transaction which “qualifies under
§ 354, 355, or 356” IRC. See Doernberg/Abrams, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Partnerships, 3.E., Ch. 11.A, Note 7 (p. 466-467). – The initial transfer to the newly created subsidiary would
otherwise qualify for non-recognition under § 351 IRC, but the reorganization provision take precedence,
cf. Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 A.1.
44

§ 355 (a)(1)(A) IRC.
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all other classes of stock.45 To meet this ownership requirement, the ownership
immediately before the distribution is decisive. After the transfer of the shares ownership
can be shared by the stockholder of the distributing corporation.46

The stock of the controlled corporation must be distributed to the shareholders
with respect to the distributing corporation’s stock or distributed to a security holder of
the distributing corporation in exchange for its securities.47 A non pro-rata distribution of
the subsidiary’s shares in exchange of the stock of the distributing corporation would
effect a split-off.48

b) Distribution of all stock
The distributing corporation must distribute all of the stock and securities in the
controlled corporation held by it immediately before the distribution to its shareholders.49
Alternatively, the distribution must comprise at least sufficient stock to constitute control
within § 368 (c) IRC and it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the
retention by the distributing corporation of stock in the controlled corporation was not
pursuant to a plan having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of tax.50 For
example, this may apply if the distributing corporation has pledged part of the
45

§ 368 (c) IRC. For details see Howley, Business Organizations with Tax Planning, Part 23, § 150.05 [2];
Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 A.4.a.; Schler,
Simplifying and Rationalizing the Spinoff Rules, 56 SMU L. Rev. 239 (259).

46

Cf. Howley, Business Organizations with Tax Planning, Part 23, § 150.05 [2], with examples. Post
distribution transfer of control might trigger § 355 (e) IRC, cf. B.III.4., for details.

47

§ 355 (a)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) IRC. See Solomon, White on New York Corporations, Part I, § 6.04 [4][b][i].

48

Fox/Fox, Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers, Part 2, § 4.09 [2][e].

49

§ 355 (a)(1)(D)(i) IRC.

50

See § 355 (a)(1)(D)(ii) IRC.
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subsidiary’s stock as collateral for a loan and is therefore not able to transfer these
shares.51

c) Active trade or business requirement
The distributing corporation and the controlled corporation have to be directly or
indirectly52 engaged immediately after the distribution in an active conduct of a trade or
business which has been so conducted throughout the 5-year period ending on the date of
distribution.53 The purpose of this requirement is to prevent the bailout of cash or investment assets by separating active trade or business in either the distributing or the controlled corporation and then selling off this corporation.54 The 5-year period is designed to
preclude a temporary investment of liquid assets in a new55 business and then spinning it
off to meet the active trade or business requirement.56 To achieve this goal, the scope of
the provision is very broad: even the taxable acquisition of the distributing corporation by
the distributee shareholder might violate the requirement if within the 5-year period.57

51

Fox/Fox, Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers, Part 2, § 4.09 [2][e]; Howley, Business Organizations
with Tax Planning, Part 23, § 150.05 [3].

52

For a indirect activity see § 355 (b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(A) IRC; Howley, Business Organizations with Tax
Planning, Part 23, § 150.05 [4]; Solomon, White on New York Corporations, Part I, § 6.04 [4][b][v].

53

Cf. § 355 (a)(1)(C), (b)(1)(A) and (2) IRC.

54

Cf. Fox/Fox, Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers, Part 2, § 4.09 [2][c]; Abrams/Doernberg, Federal
Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10.04 (a), at 266.

55

Only the acquisition of a new business violates the “active trade or business” requirement. If the
transaction can be characterized as an expansion of an existing business, i.e. the acquisition of another
business in the same line of work, tax-free treatment will still be available; see Treas. Reg. § 1.3553(b)(3)(ii); Solomon, White on New York Corporations, Part I, § 6.04 [4][d][ii].

56

Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10.04 (a), at 268; Howley, Business
Organizations with Tax Planning, Part 23, § 150.05 [5]. Note, that a business may be acquired during this
5-year period in a tax-free transaction without violating the rule, see § 355 (b)(2)(C) IRC; Fox/Fox,
Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers, Part 2, § 4.09 [2][c].
57

Cf. § 355 (b)(2)(D)(i) with (ii) IRC.
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§ 355 IRC does not define the term “active business”. According to the Regulations the corporation shall be treated as engaged in a trade or business if a specific group
of activities are being carried on by the corporation for the purpose of earning income or
profit, and the activities include every operation that forms a step in the income-earning
process.58 This trade or business is (generally) actively conducted if the corporation
performs active and substantial management and operational functions.59 An active
conduct of a trade or business does not include the holding for investment purposes of
stock, securities, land, or other property,60 or owner-occupied or leased real property with
respect to which the owner does not provide significant services.61 Therefore, the transfer
of real property to a newly formed subsidiary might not qualify if the real property is
merely leased-back to the transferor corporation. The new owner has at least to provide
sufficient management and maintenance services to qualify for an actively conducted
trade or business.62

58

Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(2)(ii).

59

See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(2)(iii), for details. Generally, these activities must be performed by the
corporation itself, i.e. its employees; cf. Howley, Business Organizations with Tax Planning, Part 23,
§ 150.05 [4].

60

Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(2)(iv)(A).

61

Rafferty v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 1971); Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(2)(iv)(B). See also
Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10.04 (a), at 266/267.

62

See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(c), Example (12). The services must be conducted by employees of the
corporation – hiring an independent contractor will not be sufficient; Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(iii). For
details regarding the spin-off of real estate cf. Howley, Business Organizations with Tax Planning, Part 23,
§ 150.05 [5][b]; Solomon, White on New York Corporations, Part I, § 6.04 [4][d][iv].
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There need not have been two active trades or businesses before the division. A
“vertical” division of a single preexisting business into two separate, independent
businesses will qualify for the “active trade or business” requirement, provided the
divided business was conducted for at least five years prior to the transaction.63

d) Not a “device”
§ 355 (a)(1)(B) IRC requires that a corporate division not be used principally as a
device for the distribution of the earnings and profits of the distributing or the controlled
corporation. Historically, the restriction was intended to prevent use of divisive transactions to convert dividend income into capital gains.64

The Regulations use a facts-and-circumstances test to determine whether a
transaction fails the device test.65 Three factors identified by the Regulations as evidence
of a “device” provide some guidance for this fact-and-circumstances test. However, the
presence of one or more of these factors is not controlling.66

First, a distribution that is pro rata or substantially pro rata among the shareholders of the distributing corporation is evidence of a “device”.67 Due to the similarity of
63

Commissioner v. Coady, 289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1961); United States v. Marett, 325 F.2d 28 (5th Cir.
1963); Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(c), Example (4); Solomon, White on New York Corporations, Part I, § 6.04
[4][d][ii]; Howley, Business Organizations with Tax Planning, Part 23, § 150.05 [5][a].
64

Today, the meaning and scope of the “device clause” seems not free of uncertainty; Lind/Schwarz/
Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 C.3.a.

65

Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(1).

66

Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 C.3.a. How to
balance the relevant factors is illustrated by Howley, Business Organizations with Tax Planning, Part 23,
§ 150.05 [8].
67

Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2)(ii).
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such a pro rata distribution to a regular dividend the criteria seems convincing. However,
this interpretation might be in conflict with § 355 (a)(2)(A) IRC.68 The second factor
mentioned in the Regulations is a subsequent sale or exchange of stock of the distributing
or controlled corporation.69 The greater the percentage of the stock sold and the shorter
the period of time between the distribution and the sale or exchange, the stronger the
evidence of a device.70 If the subsequent sale or exchange is negotiated or agreed upon
before the distribution, this shall be treated as substantial evidence of a device. But even
without such a prior arrangement, the sale or exchange shall be evidence of a device.71
Notably, § 355 (a)(1)(B) IRC itself states thata subsequent sale – if not pre-arranged –
shall not be construed to mean the transaction was used principally as a device. Again the
Regulations appear to be in conflict with the language of the Code.72 The result may be
justified in assuring continuity of interest, but the utilization of the “device” clause does
not seem convincing. The third device factor under the Regulations is “the nature, kind,
amount and use of the assets of the distributing and controlled corporation”.73 E.g. the
spin-off of liquid or other assets not used in trade or business shall be evidence of device,
even if these assets satisfy the requirements of § 355 (b) IRC.74

68

Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10.04 (a), at 265.

69

Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2)(iii).

70

Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2)(iii)(A).

71

Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2)(iii)(B).

72

Cf. Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 C.3.b.

73

Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2)(iv).

74

Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2)(iv)(B).
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The Regulations also list three factors which are evidence that a distribution is not
a device (“corporate business purpose”, “distributing corporation publicly traded and
widely held”, “distribution to domestic corporate shareholders entitled to dividends
received deduction”)75. In addition, the Regulations describe distributions that will not be
treated as a device. E.g., if neither the distributing corporation nor the controlled corporation has earnings and profits, the distribution will not be treated as a “device”.76 This
appears to be justified: no bail-out of earnings and profits without earnings and profits.77

In summary, the “device” requirement is utilized as a do-it-all provision. This
seems reasonable to prevent tax avoidance. However, the wording of the Code might not
support the broad understanding of the “device” clause.

e) Independent business purpose
The business purpose doctrine originated in Gregory v. Helvering78 has become
an important limitation under § 355 IRC.79 It parallels the “device” clause in its focus on
the taxpayer’s motivation of the transaction.80 However, the test is much broader as the
inquiry is not focused on whether the taxpayer tries to circumvent taxation on dividends

75

Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(3)(ii)-(iv).

76

See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(5)(ii).

77

Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10.04 (a), at 265.

78

Supreme Court of the United States, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).

79

Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 C.1.; Abrams/
Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10.04 (a), at 262.
80

Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 C.1.
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by achieving capital gains treatment, but rather on whether the transaction is driven by
any kind of tax avoidance.81

The business purpose test requires the division to be motivated by some business
purpose of the corporate enterprise as opposed to business purpose of a shareholder.82
According to the Regulations, such a corporate business purpose is a “real and substantial
non-Federal tax purpose germane to the business of the distributing corporation, the
controlled corporation, or the affiliated group to which the distributing corporation
belongs”.83 Accepted reasons for a division include compliance with an antitrust order,
resolution of shareholder conflicts, and facilitation of a public offering,84 but not the
reduction of Federal taxes (e.g. distribution to facilitate an election under Subchapter S,
even if no tax avoidance).85 Shareholder purposes are only of relevance if they interfere
with the corporate sphere, as in the case of shareholder conflicts, which might impede

81

Cf. Solomon, White on New York Corporations, Part I, § 6.04 [4][b][iv]; Abrams/Doernberg, Federal
Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10.04 (a), at 263. Please note, that a transaction motivated neither by
legitimate business concerns nor by tax avoidance will not qualify as a tax-free division under § 355 IRC;
Howley, Business Organizations with Tax Planning, Part 23, § 150.06 [1].
82

Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1).

83

Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(2).

84

See Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 C.1.;
Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10.04 (a), at 263. – Rev. Proc. 96-30, 1996-1
C.B. 696, provides for guidelines with respect to the business purpose requirement and sets forth the
formalities the taxpayer has to comply with to obtain an advance ruling; cf. Fox/Fox, Corporate
Acquisitions and Mergers, Part 2, § 4.09 [2][b]; Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of
Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 C.1.
85

Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(5), Example (6). This approach may be questionable, see Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10.04 (a), at 264; Solomon, White on New York Corporations,
Part I, § 6.04 [4][d][vii].
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corporate performance.86 Although there is a valid business purpose, the transaction will
not qualify for tax-free treatment under § 355 IRC if this business purpose can be
achieved through another kind of nontaxable transaction which is neither impractical nor
unduly expensive.87 Due to this broad wording (“neither impractical nor ‘unduly’
expensive”) even pure business decisions might not qualify for § 355 IRC.88

f) Continuity of interest requirement
The Regulations require that those persons with an interest in the corporate
enterprise prior to the division must own, in the aggregate, stock establishing “continuity
of interest” in each of the modified corporate forms in which the enterprise is conducted
after the distribution.89 This requirement is intended to prevent tax-free treatment of
transactions that are substantially equivalent to a sale to third parties.90 Accordingly, the
continuity of interest requirement is not violated by a non-pro rata distribution leaving
some shareholders owning the distributing corporation and other shareholders owning the
controlled corporation. In aggregate, the former shareholders91 of the distributing

86

Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(2); see also Howley, Business Organizations with Tax Planning, Part 23,
§ 150.06 [1]; Solomon, White on New York Corporations, Part I, § 6.04 [4][d][vii]; Abrams/Doernberg,
Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10.04 (a), at 263.
87

Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(3).

88

If the Regulations are applied in accordance with Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(5), Examples (4) and (5), this
might not be a problem since the results seem correct. But not every case is such a clear shot; cf. Solomon,
White on New York Corporations, Part I, § 6.04 [4][d][vii].

89

Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(1). See Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate
Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 C.2.
90

Howley, Business Organizations with Tax Planning, Part 23, § 150.06 [2].

91

According to Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 C.2.,
shareholders who acquire stock in the distributing corporation prior to the time that this corporation decides
to engage in a division should qualify as former or “historic” shareholders.
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corporation still own the modified corporate forms resulting from this transaction.92
However, a minimum continuity must be retained in each of the modified corporate
forms after the distribution93 – an ownership of 50% is sufficient for the continuity of
interest requirement, an ownership of 20% is not.94

3. Tax consequences for the parties of the corporate division
a) Taxation of a division within the legal requirements
If all the requirements of § 355 IRC are met, the distribution of stock will be taxfree both on corporate and shareholder level.

The corporation does not have to recognize any gain otherwise triggered by the
distribution of appreciated stock.95 According to § 311 (b)(1)(A) IRC (“distribution to
which subpart A [i.e. §§ 301-307 IRC] applies”) this provision of the Code does not
apply to transactions under § 355 IRC.96 If the corporation distributes boot97 in addition
to the stock, gain (but not loss) in the amount the fair market value of the boot exceeds its
adjusted basis has to be recognized under § 355 (c) IRC or (in case of a “D reorganiza-

92

Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(2), Example (1).

93

A sale shortly after the distribution may violate the continuity of interest requirement, cf. Lind/Schwarz/
Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 C.2.

94

See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(2), Examples (2) and (4); Solomon, White on New York Corporations, Part
I, § 6.04 [4][b][ii].

95

§ 355 (c)(1) IRC. For general treatment of a distribution of appreciated property see § 311 (b)(1) IRC.

96

Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10.04 (b), at 270; Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/
Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 D.3.

97

Stock of a controlled corporation acquired by the distributing corporation in a taxable transaction within
5 years of the distribution is treated as boot, see § 355 (a)(3)(B) IRC. For details cf. Howley, Business
Organizations with Tax Planning, Part 23, § 150.07 [1].
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tion”) under § 361 (c) IRC.98 Earnings and profits of the transferor corporation are apportioned between the transferor and the transferee corporation.99 No other tax attributes of
the distributing corporation are affected – § 381 IRC, providing for carryover of net
operating loss, does not apply even if the distribution is part of a “D reorganization”.100

According to § 355 (a) IRC the shareholder generally does not have to recognize
any gain or loss in the distribution. If the shareholder in addition to the stock receives
boot he might be taxable under § 356 (a) or (b) IRC. Boot received in a distribution is
taxed up to an amount equal to fair market value of the boot under the tax regime for
distributions of property (i.e. § 301 IRC).101 If boot is received in an exchange (e.g. splitoff), any gain realized in this exchange will be taxable up to an amount equal to fair
market value of the boot.102 The basis of the stock received by the distributee shareholder
is determined under § 358 IRC. If the shareholder receives no boot, the aggregated basis
of his original stock will be allocated among the stock distributed and the stock retained
in proportion to their fair market value.103 If boot is received, the boot will take a basis
equal to its fair market value; the amount allocable to any stock distributed and retained
will be decreased by the amount of the boot received and increased by the amount of any
98

Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10.04 (b), at 270.

99

For details cf. Howley, Business Organizations with Tax Planning, Part 23, § 150.10; Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 D.3.

100

Cf. § 381 (a), (c) IRC; Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E.,
Ch. 10 D.3.
101

Cf. § 356 (b) IRC.

102

See § 356 (a) IRC; for details Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation,
5.E., Ch. 10 D.2.

103

Cf. § 358 (a)(1), (b)(1) and (2) IRC.
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dividend or gain recognized.104 The shareholder’s holding period in the stock received
includes the holding period of the stock of the distributing corporation.105

b) Taxation of a failed division
The tax consequences of the distribution itself depend on the form of divisive
transaction.106 This distinction applies, whether the defective division is part of a “D
reorganization” or the corporation distributed stock of a pre-existing subsidiary. In the
case of a “D reorganization” the formation of the NewCo still qualifies for nonrecognition, governed by § 351 IRC rather than § 368 IRC.107

If a pro-rata spin-off fails to qualify under § 355 IRC, the transaction will be taxed
as a distribution (i.e. § 301 IRC). The shareholder will be taxed as receiving a dividend to
the extent of current and accumulated earnings and profits; the fair market value of stock
distributed exceeding this amount and the shareholders’ basis for their stock in the distributing corporation will be treated as capital gain.108 A failed split-off will be tested under
the stock redemption rules of § 302 IRC.109 If the redemption does not meet the

104

§ 358 (a)(1)(A) and (B), (2) IRC.

105

See § 1223 (1)(B) IRC; Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E.,
Ch. 10 D.2.
106

Solomon, White on New York Corporations, Part I, § 6.04 [4][e].

107

Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 D.4.

108

Solomon, White on New York Corporations, Part I, § 6.04 [4][e][ii]; Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg,
Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 D.4.; Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation,
5.E., Ch. 10.04 (b), at 270.
109

Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 D.4.; Solomon,
White on New York Corporations, Part I, § 6.04 [4][e][iii].
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requirements for exchange treatment (cf. § 302 (b) IRC), it will be treated as ordinary
distribution under § 301 IRC.110

The distributing corporation in a failed spin-off or split-off must recognize gain
on any unrealized appreciation in the stock distributed as if it had sold the shares for an
amount equal to its fair market value; no loss is recognized.111

4. Special provisions with respect to change of control
Until 1986, the General Utilities doctrine permitted a corporation to distribute
appreciated property to its shareholders without recognizing gain on the appreciation.112
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 introduced several changes strengthening the corporate
double taxation. Especially, a distribution of appreciated property was no longer possible
without triggering tax on corporate level.113 A tax-free division of a corporate business in
preparation for a sale of stock of either the distributing or the controlled corporation may
contravene this new policy.114 Accordingly, Congress added § 355 (d) and (e) IRC, which
provide for a taxation of the distributing corporation in case of a pre- or post-distribution
transfer of control.115

110

Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 D.4.

111

§ 311 (a)(2), (b)(1) IRC. See Solomon, White on New York Corporations, Part I, § 6.04 [4][e];
Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 D.4.

112

General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).

113

§ 311 (b) IRC.

114

See Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 E.1.c., citing
the House Ways and Means Committee, 101st Congress, 2d Sess. 90-92 (1990).
115

Cf. Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10.04 (c), at 271.
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a) § 355 (d) IRC
According to § 355 (d) IRC, in case of a disqualified distribution the distributing
corporation has to recognize gain on any appreciated stock distributed.116 A distribution
is disqualified, if one person (1) by means of purchase117 acquires stock of the
distributing or the controlled corporation within a 5-year period ending on date of
distribution, and (2) the stock held by this person so acquired or attributable to
distributions on stock so acquired immediately after the distribution represents at least
50% (by vote or value) of stock of the distributing or controlled corporation.118 The
consequence of this provision is a kind of pre-distribution continuity of interest test,
without triggering tax on the shareholder level.119

To prevent avoidance of the 50% or more ownership test, aggregation and
attribution rules are applied to determine the shareholder ownership after distribution.120
In addition, the 5-year pre-distribution holding period might be extended under certain
circumstances for any time period during which the holder’s risk of loss with respect to

116

§ 355 (d)(1) IRC. The controlled corporation is not permitted to increase the basis of its assets to reflect
any gain recognized by the distributing corporation; cf. Burke, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations
and Stockholders, 5.E., Ch. 10 § 14, at 318; see also Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E.,
Ch. 10.04 (c), at 275, regarding § 355 (e) IRC.
117

As defined in § 355 (d)(5) IRC, which excludes certain non-recognition transactions. Cf. Howley,
Business Organizations with Tax Planning, Part 23, § 150.11.

118

§ 355 (d)(2) and (3) IRC. Example: Purchaser may acquire stock of the parent equal in value to the
value of the desired subsidiary, and later surrender that stock for stock of the subsidiary in a transaction
intended to qualify as non-pro-rata division under § 355 IRC; cf. Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate
Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10.04 (c), at 271.

119

Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 E.1.c.

120

See § 355 (d)(7) and (8) IRC. For details cf. Howley, Business Organizations with Tax Planning, Part
23, § 150.11; Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 E.1.c.,
at 554.
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the stock is substantially diminished.121 Due to the broad aggregation and attribution rules
§ 355 (d) IRC might apply in situations in which the distribution does not violate the
purpose of § 355 (d) IRC. According to the Regulations in such a case § 355 (d) IRC will
not trigger taxation (so-called “purpose exception”).122

b) § 355 (e) IRC
According to § 355 (e) IRC, the distributing corporation has to recognize gain on
any appreciated stock distributed in a transaction to which the subsection applies.123
§ 355 (e) IRC is triggered by any distribution under § 355 IRC which is part of a plan (or
series of related transactions) pursuant to which 1 or more persons acquire directly or
indirectly stock representing at least 50% (by vote or value) in the distributing or any
controlled corporation.124 The provision was enacted in response to concerns that socalled Morris-Trust-type transactions (i.e. divisive reorganization followed by a tax-free
merger)125 could be utilized to avoid taxes.126 The “device” requirement might not be
violated in such a case because the pre-arranged disposition of the distributing

121

§ 355 (d)(6) IRC. See also Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation,
5.E., Ch. 10 E.1.c., at 555; Howley, Business Organizations with Tax Planning, Part 23, § 150.11.

122

Treas. Reg. § 1.355-6(b)(3)(i): If the effect of the distribution is neither to increase ownership
(combined direct and indirect) in the distributing corporation or any controlled corporation by a
disqualified person (as defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.355-6(b)(3)(ii)), nor to provide a disqualified person with
a purchased basis in the stock of any controlled corporation.
123

§ 355 (e)(1) IRC.

124

See § 355 (e)(2)(A) IRC.

125

Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966).

126

Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10.04 (c)(ii), at 274.
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corporation occurs as part of a tax-free transaction; such a disposition might not bail-out
earnings and profits since the shareholders continue to hold stock.127

Decisive for the application of § 355 (e) IRC is the existence of a “plan”.
According to § 355 (e)(2)(B) IRC such a plan is presumed to exist if one or more persons
acquire directly or indirectly stock representing at least 50% in the distributing or any
controlled corporation occurring less than two years before or after the distribution.
Transfers taking place outside this 4-year window receive no presumption for or against
taxation under § 355 (e) IRC.128 In such cases the existence of a plan will be decided
based on all facts and circumstances, if no “safe harbor” rule applies.129 An “acquisition ”
of corporate control within § 355 (e) IRC is not limited to the taxable or tax-free transfer
of stock. Under § 355 (e)(3)(B) IRC tax-free acquisitions of assets of the distributing or
any controlled corporation (e.g. tax-free merger) are treated as acquiring stock in the
corporation from which the assets were acquired.130

As § 355 (d) IRC the provision levies tax only on the distributing corporation; for
the shareholders the transaction remains tax-free. The amount of gain recognized by the
distributing corporation is determined by the appreciation of the distributed stock,
127

See Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10.04 (c)(ii), at 273.

128

Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10.04 (c)(ii), Fn. 129.

129

Temp. Reg. § 1.355-7T(b)(1). For so-called “plan factors” and “non-plan factors” see Temp. Reg.
§ 1.355-7T(b)(3) and (4). For “safe harbor” rules cf. Temp. Reg. § 1.355-7T(d)(1)-(7). See also
Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 E.2., at 557,
discussing the original proposed Regulations, and Schler, Simplifying and Rationalizing the Spinoff Rules,
56 SMU L. Rev. 239 (274/275).
130

Cf. Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10.04 (c)(ii), at 276.
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regardless whether the distributing or the controlled corporation is acquired.131 Despite
the fact that the appreciation in the stock distributed is taxed no adjustment will be made
to the basis of any corporate assets even if this results in a “triple tax”.132

C. German law
I. Basic understanding of applicable corporate law
1. German corporate law
German corporate law, as distinguished from the U.S. system, is Federal law. It
provides for two major types of corporations, the stock corporation (“Aktiengesellschaft”
– AG) and the limited liability company (“Gesellschaft mit beschraenkter Haftung” –
GmbH). Both are separate legal entities with liability of the shareholder limited to the
corporation’s assets (including any outstanding contributions of the shareholders). Both
can be formed by one or more persons, including individuals or other corporations.

The GmbH is the corporate form of choice of most investors. Due to the
flexibility offered, the GmbH is generally preferred as corporate form for closely held
companies. According to § 45 (1) of Limited Liability Company Act (“Gesetz betreffend
die Gesellschaften mit beschraenkter Haftung” – GmbHG) it is up to the shareholders to
customize the articles of association to the needs of the enterprise. Furthermore, GmbHG
allows shareholders at the shareholders’ meeting not only to formulate general guidelines

131

Burke, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Stockholders, 5.E., Ch. 10 § 14, at 323.

132

See Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 E.2, at 557;
Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10.04 (c)(ii), at 275/276.
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for management, but also to specifically instruct the management with respect to business
decisions. It is therefore the preferred form for corporate subsidiaries.

Most of Germany’s largest corporations are incorporated in the corporate form of
an AG. Unlike a GmbH,133 the shares of an AG can be transferred with relative ease,134
thereby enabling the enterprise to be listed on a stock exchange. This transferability
comes with a price: the legal structure for the AG is relatively strict – the articles of an
AG may depart from statutory provisions only where this is expressly allowed by the
German Stock Corporation Act (“Aktiengesetz” – AktG).135

2. Spin-off transactions under German law
The reorganization and restructuring of business entities under German law is
governed by the German Transformation Act (“Umwandlungsgesetz” – UmwG). The
German Transformation Act’s goal is to reduce formalities when a legal structure is
changed. UmwG permits the process of reorganization to take place by way of universal
succession (“Gesamtrechtsnachfolge”).136

UmwG deals with three different types or reorganizations, namely merger
(“Verschmelzung”), splitting (“Spaltung”) and the conversion of a business entity to

133

See § 15 (3)-(5) GmbHG – contractual transfer of ownership must be notarized and can be made
conditional upon the consent of the GmbH or other shareholders.

134

Cf. § 68 AktG according to which the articles of incorporation only in the case of registered shares
(“Namensaktien” – i.e., where the name of the owner is registered in the AG’s share register) may provide
that a transfer requires the consent of the company.

135

Cf. § 23 (5) AktG.

136

See § 20 (1) No. 1 UmwG
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another legal form (“Formwechsel”). Within the splitting reorganization the UmwG
distinguishes further between a split-up of the legal entity into two or more new or
existing entities (“Aufspaltung”),137 a spin-off of part of the assets of the entity to a new
or existing other corporation in exchange for stock in this corporation (“Ausgliederung” –
thereafter “spin-off type II”),138 and a spin-off of part of the assets of the entity to a new
or existing other corporation for stock in this corporation transferred directly to the
shareholders of the transferring corporation (“Abspaltung” – thereafter “spin-off
type I”).139 From a corporate perspective the last mentioned form of the spin-off is similar
to the “D reorganization” under § 368 (a)(D) IRC.

The split-up and spin-off type I (“Abspaltung”) allow to divide a corporation in
one transaction. A similar result can be reached by a two-step approach, first transferring
assets into an existing or new wholly owned subsidiary and then distributing the stock of
this subsidiary to the corporation’s shareholders. Even if the economic effect of this twostep approach is the same as in a so-called Abspaltung (the shareholder of the transferor
corporation in the end own stock of the transferor corporation as well as of the transferee
corporation), the tax treatment will be different.140

The text will focus on the spin-off type I (“Abspaltung”), since it is the transaction most similar to a reorganization under § 368 (a)(D) IRC. However, the tax
137

§ 123 (1) UmwG.

138

§ 123 (3) UmwG.

139

§ 123 (2) UmwG.

140

See C.III.4.
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treatment of stock distributed to shareholders will be discussed to show the differences
between German tax law and the treatment under § 355 IRC.

II. Basic information: German corporate tax regime
1. General corporate tax regime
Today’s corporate tax regime under the Corporation Tax Act (“Koerperschaftsteuergesetz” – KStG) is based on the changes implemented by the Tax Reform in 2000.
Prior to this reform, two corporate tax rates existed: retained earnings were taxed at a tax
rate of 40%, distributed earnings were taxed at only 30%. To avoid double taxation, the
shareholder receiving the distribution was credited with the 30% of tax paid by the
corporation, but had to include the distribution (plus the 30% of tax credited) in his
taxable income.

The 2000 Tax Reform introduced a definitive flat tax rate of 25% for corporations, regardless of whether the profits are retained or distributed.141 In case of an individual the distribution is subject to the “half-income” rule (“Halbeinkuenfteverfahren”)
on the shareholder level – only 50% of the amount distributed has to be included in
taxable income.142 If the earnings are distributed to a domestic corporation, no further tax
has to be paid – the distribution is exempt from taxable income.143 As the consequence,
costs which are related to this exempt income are non-deductible.144

141

§ 23 (1) KStG.

142

§ 20 (1) No. 1 with § 3 No. 40 (d) German Income Tax Act (“Einkommensteuergesetz” – EStG).

143

§ 8b (1) KStG.

144

§ 3c (1) EStG.
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If the shares are sold by an individual, the capital gain is generally included in
taxable income and taxed at ordinary tax rates. Only if the shares are held by an
individual as “private assets” (“Privatvermoegen” – i.e. for investment purposes), were
not received in a tax free contribution in kind (so-called “Einbringung”) and present an
ownership of less than 1% in the corporation, capital gains are tax free, provided the
shares are sold after a holding period of one year.145 In any case, however, in analogy to
the treatment of dividends only 50% of the capital gain is included in the taxable income
of the individual.146 If the stock is sold by a corporation any gain is exempt from
income.147

2. Determining taxable income of the corporation
A Corporation resident in Germany, i.e. maintaining either its registered office or
its central place of management in Germany, is subject to taxation on its world-wide
income (“unbeschraenkte Steuerpflicht”). As an underlying principle of determining this
world-wide income, tax accounting is based on financial accounting (“Massgeblichkeitsprinzip”). Therefore, taxable income is based on the results shown by the annual financial
accounts, adjusted to comply with special tax provisions. Tax losses which cannot be
offset in the current year may be carried back one year to a limited amount and may be

145

See § 21 German Transformation Tax Act (“Umwandlungssteuergesetz” – UmwStG), § 23 (1) No. 2
EStG and § 17 EStG.

146

Cf. § 3 No. 40, sentence 1, lit. a), c), and j) with § 3c (2) EStG. If the shares were received in a tax free
contribution in kind, generally the 50%-exemption is applicable only after a holding period of seven years,
see § 3 No. 40, sentence 3 and 4 EStG.
147

§ 8b (2) KStG which is subject to the anti-tax avoidance provision of § 8b (4) KStG.
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carried forward indefinitely.148 Capital gains are included in taxable income – no special
tax rates apply.

3. Consolidated group
German tax law does not provide for consolidated tax returns. However, the tax
treatment of the so-called “Organschaft” provides similar relief. Under these rules income
or loss of a controlled company (“Organgesellschaft”) is attributed to the controlling
company (“Organtraeger”).149 The controlled company is only taxed on payments to
minority shareholders.150 In order to qualify for Organschaft, a profit and loss pooling
agreement (“Ergebnisabfuehrungsvertrag”) must be in place, and the controlling
company must hold at least the majority of voting stock of the controlled corporation.151

4. Additional taxes, especially Trade tax
In addition to Corporation tax the taxable income of corporate entities is subject
to Trade Tax (“Gewerbesteuer”) and Solidarity Surcharge (“Solidaritaetszuschlag”).

Trade Tax is based on federal law, but is levied by local municipalities, based on
corporation’s “trade income” (“Gewerbeertrag”), which is the taxable income for
Corporation Tax purposes, increased by certain additions and decreased by certain
deductions. Trade Tax is then determined by applying a multiplier (“Hebesatz”) differing

148

§ 8 (1), (4) KStG with § 10d EStG

149

See § 14 KStG.

150

Cf. § 15, 16 KStG.

151

For details see § 14 No. 1, 3 KStG.
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for each local municipality. As a rule of thumb, Trade Tax creates circa 13% of additional tax levy for the corporation.

The Solidarity Surcharge of 5.5% is levied on the assessed amount of Corporation
Tax. The tax rate for corporations of 25% is therefore increased by the Solidarity
Surcharge to 26.375%.

III. Taxation of Spin-offs
1. Overview
Under German tax law, there are specific provisions for split-up, spin-off type I
and type II. The German Transformation Tax Act (“Umwandlungssteuergesetz” –
UmwStG) provides for tax free treatment on corporate as well as shareholder level, if
certain requirements are met.

The main purpose of the German spin-off rules is to facilitate a separation of
different businesses of a corporate entity into one or more existing or new corporate
entities. Accordingly, the spin-off type I under German Transformation Tax Act requires
that the transferee corporation acquires at least one business (“Teilbetrieb” – thereafter
also “operational unit”) and the transferor corporation retains at least one such operational unit. Furthermore, the transfer must be solely in exchange for stock of the
transferee corporation.

If these requirements are met, the transaction generally does not trigger taxes.
Carryover losses as well as any tax credits of the transferor corporation will be
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apportioned between transferor and transferee. Notwithstanding this general treatment,
the transaction will be taxable if the splitting results in a sale to outside parties or the
additional conditions for a separation of shareholder groups are not met.

2. General requirements of § 15 UmwStG
a) Divisive transaction under the German Transformation Act
In order to qualify for tax free treatment under § 15 UmwStG the divisive
transaction must be a split-up or spin-off type I under the German Transformation Act.
Other types of divisive transactions do not qualify under the German Transformation Tax
Act.152

b) Separation of “operational units”
According to § 15 (1) UmwStG for a spin-off type I to qualify for tax free
treatment the transferee corporation must acquire at least one operational unit153 and the
transferor corporation must retain at least one such operational unit.154

An operational unit is understood as an organically self-contained part of an
enterprise enjoying a certain amount of independence which, when viewed separately,
has all the characteristics of a business unit and is viable as such.155 An interest in a
partnership engaged in trade or business as well as a 100%-holding in a corporation is

152

Cf. § 15 (1), sentence 1 UmwStG with § 1 (1) and (4) UmwStG. The spin-off type II is subject to the
rules of § 20 UmwStG, i.e. the rules for a tax-free contribution in kind.

153

§ 15 (1), sentence 1 UmwStG.

154

§ 15 (1), sentence 2 UmwStG.

155

Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15
UmwStG para. 50.
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deemed to be an operational unit.156 A transaction also qualifies if only part of an interest
in a partnership is transferred and the other part is retained by the transferor corporation.157

Decisive for the tax treatment is that all essential assets (so-called “wesentliche
Betriebsgrundslagen”) of the operational unit are transferred together (or retained).158 The
decision whether an asset is essential for the operational unit or not has to be based solely
on the function of the asset within the operational unit.159 Non-essential assets might or
might not be transferred depending on the equity contribution necessary to set up the
transferee corporation.160 If such an asset is used by various operational units (e.g. real
property), it has to be assigned to one operational unit based on time of use.161 However,
a tax free spin-off is unattainable if essential assets are used by different operational
units. Such assets have to be divided and assigned to the operational units prior to the
spin-off.162 In case of real property it might be enough to provide for ownership in

156

§ 15 (1), sentence 3 UmwStG.

157

Cf. Ministry of Finance, German Transformation Tax Act, Problems and Interpretation (so-called
“Umwandlungssteuererlass” – UmwStE), para. 15.04; Schoenwald, Die Spaltung von Kapitalgesellschaften, Steuer & Studium 2002, p. 8 (10); Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz,
Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 57.
158

Schoenwald, Die Spaltung von Kapitalgesellschaften, Steuer & Studium 2002, p. 8 (10).

159

See Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15
UmwStG para. 58. The alternative approach based on the value of the asset is not applicable under § 15
UmwStG.

160

Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 15.08; Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 67-69.
161

Schoenwald, Die Spaltung von Kapitalgesellschaften, Steuer & Studium 2002, p. 8 (10).

162

Schoenwald, Die Spaltung von Kapitalgesellschaften, Steuer & Studium 2002, p. 8 (10). Decisive is the
date of the shareholder resolution approving the spin-off; Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 15.10;
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common (so-called “Bruchteilseigentum”).163 However, the ownership of the asset or at
least the beneficial ownership must be assigned to the operational unit. A lease agreement
therefore is not sufficient.164

c) Other general requirements, especially § 11 UmwStG
If the requirements of § 15 UmwStG are met, the rules for tax free treatment of
mergers (§§ 11- 13 UmwStG) apply.165 Accordingly, the transfer of assets has to be
solely for (new or treasury)166 stock in the transferee corporation (granted to the
transferor corporation’s shareholders).167 If the shareholders of the transferor corporation
receive boot, the basis of the assets transferred in the transfer balance sheet is increased
by the amount of boot received (minus the part of the basis attributable to the boot as part
of the total consideration of boot and stock).168 As a consequence of the increase in basis,
gain has to be recognized by the transferor corporation.169

Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15
UmwStG para. 72.
163

Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 15.07. Against the restrictive approach of the German revenue
service Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15
UmwStG para. 64-66.
164

Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15
UmwStG para. 60.

165

§ 15 (1), sentence 1 UmwStG.

166

Cf. Schmitt, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 11
UmwStG para. 84.

167

§ 11 (1) No. 2 UmwStG.

168

§ 11 (2), sentence 1 UmwStG. For details cf. Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 11.06, 11.20; Schmitt,
in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 11 UmwStG para.
92-95.

169

Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 11.22; Schmitt, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz,
Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 11 UmwStG para. 92.
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Furthermore, the assets transferred must be subject to German corporate taxation
in the transferee corporation.170 This is the case, if the transferee corporation’s place of
incorporation or place of management is in Germany171 and the transferee corporation is
not exempt from German Corporation Tax.172

3. Tax consequences of a spin-off under § 15 UmwStG
a) Spin-off in accordance with § 15 UmwStG
(i) Taxation of the transferor corporation
The transferor corporation has to prepare a transfer balance sheet for tax purposes
as of the transfer date for tax purposes (so-called “Uebertragungsstichtag”),173 which may
provide for retroactive effect up to eight months. The German Transformation Tax Act
offers alternative treatment in the transfer balance sheet. According to the tax law the
transferor corporation may elect to transfer the assets tax free or to write up the assets
transferred in the transfer balance sheet up to the so-called going concern value
(“Teilwert”),174 thereby realizing gain in the amount of the Teilwert minus adjusted
basis.175 However, since German financial accounting generally does not permit to

170

§ 11 (1) No. 1 UmwStG.

171

See § 1 (1) KStG.

172

Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 11.03; Schmitt, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz,
Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 11 UmwStG para. 60, 66.
173

§ 15 (2) UmwStG.

174

“Teilwert” is the amount an acquirer would pay for the asset as part of the purchase price for the whole
trade or business, cf. § 6 (1) No. 1, sentence 3 EStG.
175

§ 15 (1) UmwStG with § 11 UmwStG. See also Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 236.
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recognize gain in the transfer balance sheet and the tax accounting has to follow financial
accounting,176 typically tax free treatment is the only viable option.177

If the shareholders of the transferor corporation receive boot in addition to the
stock, the transferor corporation is taxed on the gain resulting from the mandatory writeup of the basis of the assets transferred.178

(ii) Taxation of the transferee corporation
For the transferee corporation the spin-off does not trigger taxable income.179 The
basis in the assets transferred is the same as it would be in the hands of the transferor
corporation (so-called “Buchwertfortfuehrung”).180 I.e., generally the assets’ basis is the
adjusted basis in the hands of the transferor corporation. However, if boot was part of the
consideration, the new basis in the hands of the transferee corporation reflects the
necessary write-up of the assets transferred.

The transferee corporation is the legal successor of the transferor corporation by
means of universal succession. Accordingly, the transferee corporation applies the same

176

See above, under C.II.2. (so-called “Massgeblichkeitsprinzip”).

177

Cf. Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 15.12; Schoenwald, Die Spaltung von Kapitalgesellschaften,
Steuer & Studium 2002, p. 8 (14). According to Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 241, the Massgeblichkeitsprinzip does not
apply allowing the transferor corporation to opt for a taxable transfer (e.g. to offset carry-over losses).
178

See above, under C.III.2.c).

179

Schoenwald, Die Spaltung von Kapitalgesellschaften, Steuer & Studium 2002, p. 8 (9).

180

§ 15 (1) UmwStG with §§ 12 (1), 4 (1) UmwStG.
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general and special depreciation; holding periods for tax purposes are computed based on
the acquisition date by the transferor corporation.181

The transferee corporation succeeds in a net operating loss of the transferor
corporation. The total loss carryover of the transferor corporation has to be allocated to
the operational units transferred and retained based on the fair market value of the net
assets182 transferred or retained.183 However, the trade or business to which the loss is
attributable has to be continued for another five years on a comparable level184.
Otherwise the loss carryover allocated to the transferee corporation will cease.185

(iii) Taxation of the shareholder
As a result of the spin-off type I the shareholders of the transferor corporation
receive stock of the transferee corporation. The transaction is tax free on shareholder
level.186 The basis of the transferor corporation’s stock in the hands of each shareholder
prior to the spin-off has to be allocated between the retained shares of the transferor

181

§ 15 (1) UmwStG with § 12 (3), sentence 1 UmwStG. Cf. Schoenwald, Die Spaltung von
Kapitalgesellschaften, Steuer & Studium 2002, p. 8 (14); Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz,
Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 261.

182
Fair market value of the assets minus liabilities attributable to these assets; see Schoenwald, Die
Spaltung von Kapitalgesellschaften, Steuer & Studium 2002, p. 8 (14).
183

§ 15 (4) UmwStG. For details see Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 15.42 and 15.43; Hoertnagl, in
Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 270279.

184

It might be continued by the transferor or the transferee corporation; cf. Schoenwald, Die Spaltung von
Kapitalgesellschaften, Steuer & Studium 2002, p. 8 (13/14); Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz,
Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 269.
185

§ 15 (1) UmwStG with § 12 (3) sentence 2 UmwStG.

186

§ 15 (1) UmwStG with § 13 (1), (2), sentence 1, (3), sentence 1 UmwStG.
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corporation and the new shares of the transferee corporation based on the fair market
value of the net assets transferred and retained by the transferor corporation.187

Furthermore, to assure proper taxation in case of a later sale of the stock retained
and received, the German tax law provides for special rules tainting the stock in question.
As mentioned before,188 a stock sale by an individual shareholder is taxable if the
shareholder holds the shares in a trade or business (so-called “Betriebsvermoegen”),
holds an investment of at least 1% in the corporation,189 has received the stock in a tax
free contribution in kind190 or has held the stock for less than one year.191 § 13 UmwStG
assures that the taxation of a later sale of the stock retained or received is in line with
these rules.192 According to § 13 (2) UmwStG the stock retained and/or received is
deemed to be stock as part of an investment of at least 1% (so-called “spaltungsgeborene
Anteile”), if the stock held prior to the spin-off was such an investment. Under § 13 (3)
UmwStG the stock retained and/or received is deemed to be received in a tax free
contribution in kind, if the stock held prior to the spin-off was received in such a
contribution. Under both provisions a later sale of the stock is a taxable event even if the
requirements of §§ 17 EStG, 21 UmwStG were not met otherwise.
187
Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 15.51. According to Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz,
Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 291, the basis shall be allocated
based on the fair market value of the stock of the transferor corporation retained and the stock of the
transferee corporation received.
188

Under C.II.1.

189

§ 17 EStG.

190

Cf. § 21 UmwStG.

191

See § 23 (1) EStG.

192

Schoenwald, Die Spaltung von Kapitalgesellschaften, Steuer & Studium 2002, p. 8 (15).
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b) Consequences of a failed spin-off transaction
If the requirements of § 15 (1) and § 11 UmwStG are not met (e.g. operational
unit either not transferred or not retained) the transaction will be treated as a distribution
in kind to the transferor corporation’s shareholders.193 Accordingly, the transferor
corporation is taxed on the amount by which the fair market value of the assets
transferred exceeds the adjusted basis in the hands of the transferor corporation.194
Intangible rights as well as goodwill have to be taken into account, even if the transferor
corporation’s basis in such rights was Zero.195 The taxable income is subject to
Corporation Tax (including Solidarity Surcharge) as well as Trade Tax.

In a second step, the assets deemed distributed to the shareholders will be deemed
contributed by them to the transferee corporation.196 The transferee corporation’s basis in
the assets deemed contributed is the going concern value (“Teilwert”) of the assets.197

On the shareholder level the treatment follows the general rules for distributions.198 Individual shareholders of the transferor corporation have to include the deemed

193

Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 15.11; Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 101.
194

Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 15.11.

195

Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 15.11; Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 101.

196

Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15
UmwStG para. 102; Schoenwald, Die Spaltung von Kapitalgesellschaften, Steuer & Studium 2002, p. 8
(11).
197

Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15
UmwStG para. 102.

198

Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15
UmwStG para. 103.
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dividend in income, subject to the “half-income” rule. If the earnings are distributed to a
domestic corporation, the distribution is exempt from taxable income.199 The basis in the
transferee corporation’s stock received equals the basis of the assets deemed contributed
in the hand of the shareholders.200

4. Anti-tax avoidance rules
a) Disallowed creation of an “operational unit”, § 15 (3), sentence 1 UmwStG
The tax free treatment of §§ 15 (1), 11 (1) UmwStG requires that the transferee
corporation must acquire at least one operational unit, and the transferor corporation must
retain at least one such operational unit.201 However, tax free treatment is not available if
an interest in a partnership or a 100% -holding in a corporation (i.e., a deemed operational
unit) was acquired or increased during the 3-year period ending on the transfer date for
tax purposes (“Uebertragungsstichtag”) by contributing assets which did not constitute an
operational unit.202

The rationale of the provision is to disallow the tax-free spin-off of appreciated203
assets, which in fact are no operational unit, byconverting them into such an operational
unit prior to the actual spin-off.204 E.g., if the transferor corporation in a first step

199

See above, C.II.1.

200

Schoenwald, Die Spaltung von Kapitalgesellschaften, Steuer & Studium 2002, p. 8 (11).

201

See above, under C.III.2.b).

202

§ 15 (3), sentence 1 UmwStG.

203

I.e. fair market value exceeds adjusted basis.

204

Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15
UmwStG para. 111.
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contributes real property to a partnership for an increased interest in the partnership,205
and then in a second step spins off the partnership interest (or all other operational units,
thereby retaining the partnership interest),206 such spin-off will not qualify for tax-free
treatment.207 § 15 (3), sentence 1 UmwStG is not applicable, if not the transferor corporation, but rather an unrelated third party contributes the assets. E.g., if the transferor corporation holds 60% in X-corporation and an unrelated 40%-shareholder of X
- corporation
contributes its 40% stake to X-corporation (resulting in transferor corporation holding
100%), a tax-free spin-off of the new 100%-interest in X-corporation is still available.208

It should be noted that § 15 (3), sentence 1 UmwStG only applies to partnership
interests and 100%-holdings in corporations (so-called deemed operational units). Any
other type of operational unit might be established immediately before the spin-off.209

205

Such transaction is tax free under § 6 (5), sentence 3, No. 1 EStG.

206

Cf. Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 15.15. According to Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz,
Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 115, no tax is triggered if the
new partnership interest/100%-share is retained. This might be correct; yet, the reason for the result is not
that § 15 (3), sentence 1 UmwStG is not applicable, but rather the fact that the assets of the operational unit
to which § 11 (1) UmwStG does not apply are not transferred. Without a transfer in exchange for stock no
realization in these assets and accordingly no recognition of taxable income.
207

Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 15.16, Example 2; Schoenwald, Die Spaltung von Kapitalgesellschaften, Steuer & Studium 2002, p. 8 (11/12).
208

See Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 15.19; Schoenwald, Die Spaltung von Kapitalgesellschaften,
Steuer & Studium 2002, p. 8 (12).
209

Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15
UmwStG para. 114.
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b) No sale to outside parties, § 15 (3), sentences 2-4 UmwStG
The spin-off will notqualify for tax free treatment under § 11 (1) UmwStG if the
transaction results in a sale to outside parties.210 The same applies if the transaction shall
create the prerequisites for such a sale.211

Again the motivation for these provisions is to battle tax avoidance. The rules for
tax free spin-off shall (only) permit the taxpayer to continue a trade or business in a
different form without paying taxes up-front.212 Since the taxpayer in case of a sale does
not continue the trade or business, no tax free treatment shall be available. E.g., if the
transferor corporation in a first step spins off an operational unit and in a second step the
shareholder receiving the stock of the transferee corporation sells this stock to a third
party, taxation might be avoided completely. Without the spin-off rules such a sale of an
operational unit would trigger tax on the corporate level. By tax free spinning off the
operational unit in question the transferor corporation enables its shareholders to sell the
stock received subject to the tax rules applicable to the shareholder. The shareholder
might sell the stock received tax free, if he is a corporation,213 a foreign shareholder not

210

§ 15 (3), sentence 2 UmwStG.

211

§ 15 (3), sentence 3 UmwStG.

212

Schoenwald, Die Spaltung von Kapitalgesellschaften, Steuer & Studium 2002, p. 8 (12).

213

See § 8b (2) KStG described above, under C.II.1. Cf. also Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz,
Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 141.
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subject to German taxation on the capital gains214 or an individual who holds the stock
for one more year.215

Accordingly, the spin-off will not qualify for tax free treatment under § 11 (1)
UmwStG if the transaction results in a sale to outside parties or creates the prerequisites
for such a sale.216 Under § 15 (3), sentence 4 UmwStG, the spin-off is deemed to be such
a preparation for sale if shares of a corporation involved in the spin-off are sold within
five years of the transfer date for tax purposes and these shares equal more than 20% of
the shares of the transferor corporation before the spin-off. This limitation applies to the
shares of the transferor and the shares of the transferee corporation.

Tax under § 15 (3), sentence 2-4 UmwStG is only triggered if shares received in
the spin-off are actually sold to a third party; the sole spin-off with the intention to sell
the stock received is not sufficient.217 “Sale” to a third party218 is understood very broad:
any exchange for money or other consideration,219 any exchange for shares (i.e. merger)
214

Schoenwald, Die Spaltung von Kapitalgesellschaften, Steuer & Studium 2002, p. 8 (12); Hoertnagl, in
Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 141.
215

§ 23 (1) EStG, cf. under C.II.1.

216

The second alternative can be understood as the general rule since a sale cannot be accomplished solely
by a spin-off; cf. Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz,
3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 132.

217

Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15
UmwStG para. 142.
218

Reorganizations within a consolidated group within the meaning of § 271 (2) HGB are exempted; cf.
Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 15.26.

219

Accordingly, shares transferred not for consideration (e.g. gift or inheritance) do not trigger tax; see
Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 15.23; Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz,
Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 147.
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or any contribution in kind which economically transfers the ownership of the shares
qualifies for a “sale”.220 This sale must take place within five years after the transfer date
for tax purposes of the spin-off transaction. By means of the sale of the transferor and/or
the transferee corporation(s)’ shares221 representing more than 20% of the shares of the
transferor corporation prior to the spin-off must be assigned to third parties. The 20%quota is based on the fair market value of the stock222 transferred and comprises the total
shares transferred of all corporations involved in the spin-off (i.e. transferor as well as
transferee corporation(s)) within the five year period.223

c) Consequences of a violation of § 15 (3) UmwStG
If either § 15 (3), sentence 1 UmwStG or § 15 (3), sentence 2-4 UmwStG is
applicable, tax free treatment under § 11 (1) UmwStG will not be available. However, the
transaction is taxable only on the corporate level. The shareholders still will benefit from
§ 13 UmwStG.224

220

Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 15.24 and 15.25; Schoenwald, Die Spaltung von Kapitalgesellschaften, Steuer & Studium 2002, p. 8 (12).
221
Assets held by the transferor or transferee corporation(s) can be sold; cf. Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 156.
222

See Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 15.28; Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 170-173, for details.
223

Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 15.29 and 15.30; Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz,
Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 167.
224

Cf. Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 15.33; Lutter/Leinekugel/Roedder, Die Sachdividende –
Gesellschaftsrecht und Steuerrecht, ZGR 2002, 204 (236); Haritz/Wiesniewski, Abspaltung von Kapitalgesellschaftsbeteiligungen – Entschaerfung der Missbrauchsvorschriften in § 15 (3) UmwStG, FR 2003,
549 (549); Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E.,
§ 15 UmwStG para. 125, 202.
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The transferor corporation will be taxed on the step-up in basisof the assets
transferred. In the case of § 15 (3), sentence 1 UmwStG only the assets being part of the
operational unit which was established in violation of the provision have to be written up
to the going concern value (“Teilwert”).225 Yet, if the spin- off results in a sale to outside
parties or establishes the prerequisites for such a sale, the assets of all operational units
transferred have to be increased to the going concern value.226 The transferee corporation
will carry-over this basis as in the case of a spin-off in accordance with § 15 (1) and (3)
UmwStG without triggering taxable income.227 All the other tax consequences (successsion in depreciation, holding periods, and loss-carryover)228 are the same as in the case of
a spin-off under § 15 (1) UmwStG.229

However, the spin-off does not trigger tax on the corporate level if the transferor
corporation would have been able to transfer the operational unit tax free without
utilizing the spin-off rules. This might be the case if the operational unit transferred is a
100%-interest in a corporation. Under § 8b (2) KStG – subject to certain requirements –
such a transfer would have been tax free for the transferor corporation. Consequently, the

225

Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15
UmwStG para. 125.
226

Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15
UmwStG para. 200/201.
227

Schoenwald, Die Spaltung von Kapitalgesellschaften, Steuer & Studium 2002, p. 8 (9).

228

See above, under C.III.3.

229

Schoenwald, Die Spaltung von Kapitalgesellschaften, Steuer & Studium 2002, p. 8 (11); Hoertnagl, in
Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 125,
202.
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spin-off can not be identified as tax avoidance. Any income triggered on corporate level
by § 15 (3) UmwStG is therefore exempt under § 8b (2) KStG.230

d) Application of § 42 AO
§ 42 General Fiscal Code (“Abgabenordnung” – AO) provides for a general antitax avoidance provision. However, this general provision is not applicable if the tax law,
as in the case of § 15 (3) UmwStG, provides for special rules. Accordingly, in the context
of spin-offs § 42 AO is only applicable if the taxpayer attempts to avoid the provisions of
§ 15 (3) UmwStG. E.g., if within five years of the spin-off the shares of the transferee
corporation are transferred indirectly (by means of a sale of stock of the direct
shareholder), § 15 (3) UmwStG generally would not be applicable. In such case,
however, the indirect sale of the stock in the transferee corporation might be treated as a
direct sale by applying § 42 AO.231

5. Separation of shareholder groups, § 15 (3), sentence 5 UmwStG
If the spin-off is aimed at separating shareholders or shareholder groups (i.e., nonpro rata distribution of the shares of the transferee corporation), one additional requirement has to be met. In this case, according to § 15 (3), sentence 5 UmwStG the shareholders of the transferor corporation have to have held their stock for at least five years
prior to the spin-off.232 Otherwise § 11 (1) UmwStG does not apply, triggering taxes on

230

Haritz/Wiesniewski, Abspaltung von Kapitalgesellschaftsbeteiligungen – Entschaerfung der Missbrauchsvorschriften in § 15 (3) UmwStG, FR 2003, 549 (550/551); Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz,
Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 169.
231

Cf. Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15
UmwStG para. 160, 230/231.

232

For details see Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz,
3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 205-229.
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the corporate level.233 However, an increase or decrease in the percentage of stock held
during the five year period does not disqualify for tax free treatment as long as no change
in the shareholders’ person has taken place.234

6. Alternative transactions: distribution of stock
As an alternative to a spin-off type I transaction, the transferor corporation in a
first step might form a new subsidiary by contributing the operational unit in exchange
for stock in the NewCo.235 In a second step, the stock of the NewCo might be distributed
to the transferor corporation’s shareholders. This second step could trigger tax on the
corporate as well as the shareholder level.

Generally, the transferor corporation is taxed on the amount the fair market value
of the assets transferred exceeds the adjusted basis in the hands of the transferor
corporation. But according to a special exemption for the sale, exchange or transfer of
stock implemented by the 2000 Tax Reform, if stock is distributed any gain realized is
exempt from tax.236 However, this exemption does not apply if the stock distributed was
received by the transferor corporation in exchange for a tax free contribution in kind (so233

See above, under C.III.4.c).

234
Ministry of Finance, UmwStE, para. 15.35; Schoenwald, Die Spaltung von Kapitalgesellschaften, Steuer
& Studium 2002, p. 8 (13); Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15 UmwStG para. 224.
235

This transfer is tax free under § 20 (1), sentence 1, (2), and (4) UmwStG, if the transferor corporation is
in control of the subsidiary (50% + 1 vote) after the transaction.

236

§ 8b (2) KStG. The German Ministry of Finance does follow this approach, Ministry of Finance,
04/28/2003, DB 2003, 1027, para. 22; cf. Menner/Broer, Steuerliche Gestaltungsmoeglichkeiten bei
Umstrukturierungen im Konzern – Alternativen zur Spaltung von Kapitalgesellschaften unter besonderer
Beruecksichtigung von Sachdividenden, DB 2003, 1075, under VI.1.b)cc); Prinz/Schuerner, Tracking
Stocks und Sachdividenden – ein neues Gestaltungsinstrument fuer spartenbezogene Gesellschaftsrechte,
DStR 2003, 181 (184); Lutter/Leinekugel/Roedder, Die Sachdividende – Gesellschaftsrecht und
Steuerrecht, ZGR 2002, 204 (230), for details.
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called “einbringungsgeborene Anteile”, § 21 UmwStG).237 Accordingly, the distribution
is subject to tax on the corporate level.

On the shareholder level the treatment follows the general rules for distributions.
Individual shareholders of the transferor corporation have to include the fair market value
of the dividend in kind in income, subject to the “half-income” rule.238 If the earnings are
distributed to a domestic corporation, the distribution is exempt from taxable income.239

D. Comparison of the tax regimes and potential changes
I. Comparison of the spin-off rules
1. Overview
The U.S. as well as German tax law provide for quite similar treatment of divisive
transactions. A spin-off is tax free on both the corporate and the shareholder level, if
certain requirements are met. Both jurisdictions allow a divisive transaction only for
separating active business units. Under both tax laws the transferor corporation and the
transferee corporation have to be engaged in an active trade or business before and after
237

§ 8b (4), sentence 1 No. 1 KStG. § 8b (4) KStG provides for several anti-tax avoidance rules with
respect to the tax free exchange of stock by corporations under § 8b (2) KStG. According to § 8b (4),
sentence 2 No. 1 KStG a tax free sale, exchange, or distribution of the stock is permitted, if the stock has
been held for seven years.

238

§ 20 (1) No. 1 with § 3 No. 40 (d) EStG. See above, under C.II.1. For details Prinz/Schuerner, Tracking
Stocks und Sachdividenden – ein neues Gestaltungsinstrument fuer spartenbezogene Gesellschaftsrechte,
DStR 2003, 181 (184/185); Lutter/Leinekugel/Roedder, Die Sachdividende – Gesellschaftsrecht und
Steuerrecht, ZGR 2002, 204 (233).
239

§ 8b (1) KStG. See above, under C.II.1. For details Lutter/Leinekugel/Roedder, Die Sachdividende –
Gesellschaftsrecht und Steuerrecht, ZGR 2002, 204 (233); Prinz/Schuerner, Tracking Stocks und
Sachdividenden – ein neues Gestaltungsinstrument fuer spartenbezogene Gesellschaftsrechte, DStR 2003,
181 (185); Menner/Broer, Steuerliche Gestaltungsmoeglichkeiten bei Umstrukturierungen im Konzern –
Alternativen zur Spaltung von Kapitalgesellschaften unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung von
Sachdividenden, DB 2003, 1075, under VI.1.b)dd).
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the distribution.240 The method of choice for both jurisdictions to assure future taxation of
the appreciated property and the appreciated stock is a basis carry-over: the transferee
corporation carries over the transferor corporation’s basis and the transferor corporation’s
shareholder has to allocate his basis in the transferor corporation’s stock prior to the spinoff to both the transferor and the transferee corporation’s stock. Accordingly, both tax
regimes provide for a deferral in taxes, not an exemption.

However, there are differences with respect to the requirements as well as the tax
consequences of a spin-off transaction. The following examples shall identify differences
and will try to explain the reasons for the different approaches.

2. Structure of transaction and control requirement
U.S. and German corporate law provide for divisive transactions which might
qualify for tax free treatment. The German corporate law, however, establishes spin-off
transactions more limited in their result but easier to facilitate. The spin-off type I (socalled “Abspaltung”) combines the contribution of assets to a newly formed or existing
subsidiary in exchange for stock with the distribution of the subsidiary’s shares to the
transferor corporation’s shareholders.241 U.S. corporate law, in contrast, achieves the
same result by means of a two-step approach. First, the transferor corporation contributes

240

Under U.S. tax law the distributing and the controlled corporation have to be engaged immediately after
the distribution in an active conduct of a trade or business which has been so conducted throughout the 5
years prior to the distribution; cf. B.III.2.c). Under German tax law an operational unit has to be transferred
to the existing or newly formed subsidiary the stock of which will be distributed, and an operational unit
has to be retained by the transferor corporation – accordingly, both the transferor and the transferee
corporation will retain or receive an operational unit in the spin-off transaction; see C.III.2.b).

241

See above, under C.I.2.
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assets to a subsidiary in exchange for stock. Second, the transferor corporation distributes
the shares received to its shareholders.

The tax law reflects these differences. German tax law provides for tax free
treatment only if the spin-off transaction is in accordance with the special provisions
under German corporate law,242 whereas under U.S. tax law both the two-s tep reorganizations described above (so-called “D reorganizations”) and mere distributions of stock
in a subsidiary qualify for tax free treatment.243 Even more important, a tax free
distribution under U.S. law may be achieved without owning 100% of the subsidiary the
stock of which is distributed.244 In contrast, under German law in the typical case of a
spin-off to a newly formed subsidiary no outside ownership in the stock distributed will
be allowed.245 100% of the shares of the transferee corporation end up in the hands of the
transferor corporation’s shareholders. The same 100% ownership is required for the
transferor corporation to spin off an existing subsidiary (to achieve a similar result as
with the mere distribution of the subsidiary’s stock).246 The transaction qualifies for tax

242

See above, under C.III.2.a).

243

See above, under B.III.1.

244

Control of the subsidiary (i.e. 80% ownership of votes and shares) is sufficient, cf. B.III.2.a).

245

It should be noted, however, that the assets also can be spun off to an existing corporation with outside
shareholders. Nevertheless, the new stock will be directly transferred only to the existing shareholders of
the transferor corporation.
246

Such transaction results in the transferor corporation’s shareholders owning 100% in a holding company
which itself owns 100% of the former subsidiary. In a second step, the holding might merge with the
subsidiary in a tax free transaction under §§ 11-13 UmwStG or establish a consolidated group (so-called
“Organschaft”).
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free treatment only, if the subsidiary has been owned 100% by the transferor corporation
for the three years prior to the spin-off.247

The reasons for this more limited approach of German law might be twofold. The
German spin-off law is based on an European Union Directive which provided for the
transactions referred to as split-up (“Aufspaltung”) and spin-off type I (“Abspaltung”)
under German law.248 Based on these changes in corporate law the spin-off rules were
added to the German Transformation Tax Act.249 Accordingly, only these types of
transactions were permitted for tax free treatment.250 Second, under German law tax free
treatment generally is only available if the entire trade or business or at least an
operational unit is transferred. The transferor must have been engaged in a trade or
business via the unit transferred and the transferee must continue to be engaged like
that.251 Therefore, the interest in a partnership (which is subject to look-through treatment
under German tax law)252 engaged in a trade or business is treated as direct engagement
in such trade or business. However, in case of corporations generally no look-through
treatment is applicable. Only if the corporation is wholly owned it seems justified that the

247

See above, under C.III.2.b) and under C.III.4.a) for the related anti-tax avoidance rules.

248

Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., Vor
§§ 123-173 UmwG para. 14 and 15.
249

Cf. Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., Einf.
UmwStG para. 10, § 1 UmwStG para. 10.

250

See Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15
UmwStG para. 1.

251

Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., Vor
§§ 15, 16 UmwStG para. 9, § 15 UmwStG para. 43.

252

Cf. § 15 (1) No. 2 EStG.
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trade or business engaged in by the corporation might be assumed to be one by the
shareholder. Thus, only the transfer of a 100%-interest qualifies for tax free treatment
under the German Transformation Tax Act.253

It should be noted that under § 8b (2) KStG introduced by the 2000 Tax Reform a
distribution of stock does not trigger tax on the corporate level.254 Yet, these new rules
were not meant to change the spin-off rules, but rather as to avoid double taxation under
the new corporate tax regime which is no longer based on a credit for taxes paid by the
corporation.255

3. Device clause and more restrictive active business requirement
Both the U.S. and the German tax law provided for an active business requirement.256 Under the U.S. tax regime, however, the active business requirement is much
more restrictive. No investment of liquid assets in a new business will be allowed in the
five years prior to the spin-off.257 Under German tax law, in contrast, an operational unit
may be established immediately before the spin-off takes place.258 Only if deemed operational units are created or increased within three years prior to the divisive transaction,

253

Different rules apply in the case of a contribution in kind in exchange for stock (§ 20 UmwStG).
However, the requirement of an interest of more than 50% in the corporation’s stock (§ 20 (1), sentence 2
UmwStG) is based on European Union law, implemented in German law in 1992, cf. Schmitt, in
Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 20 UmwStG para. 134.

254

§ 8b (2) KStG is subject to certain anti-tax avoidance rules under § 8b (4) KStG; cf. C.III.6.

255

See C.II.1.

256

See above, under D.I.1.

257

See above, under B.III.2.c).

258

Hoertnagl, in Schmitt/Hoertnagl/Stratz, Umwandlungsgesetz, Umwandlungssteuergesetz, 3.E., § 15
UmwStG para. 74.
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tax free treatment is not available.259 Furthermore, U.S. tax law provides in § 355 (a) IRC
for the so-called “device clause”. This additional requirement denies tax free treatment
for any divisive transaction which is used principally as a device for the distribution of
the earnings and profits of the distributing or the controlled corporation.260 German tax
law does not contain any similar provision.

Both requirements under U.S. tax law are aimed to prevent the bailout of cash by
means of a spin-off transaction. If such transactions would qualify for tax free treatment
under U.S. tax law, taxpayers could easily convert dividends into capital gains. Since for
most of the time of the spin-off rules’ existence capital gain tax rates were significantly
lower than ordinary tax rates on dividends this conversion benefited the taxpayer.261
Under German tax law there is no comparable differentiation between the tax rates on
dividends and capital gains. At the time of enactment of the German spin-off provisions
both dividends and capital gains were subject to regular tax rates. Starting with the Tax
Reform 2000, dividends received by individual shareholders have been subject to the
half-income rule (“Halbeinkuenfteverfahren”). However, capital gains on the sale or
exchange of stock are subject to the same 50%-exemption.262 And stock related income

259

See above, under C.III.4.a).

260

See above, under B.III.2.d).

261

Cf. B.II.1.

262

Cf. C.II.1. At any time there was and still is tax free treatment available for the sale of stock held by an
individual for investment purposes if the individual holds less than 1% in that corporation and the shares
are held for more than one year (see §§ 17 (1), 23 (1) EStG). Yet, due to the requirement of less than 1%
ownership these individual shareholders are typically not in a position to initiate a spin-off transaction for
tax avoidance purposes. Furthermore, the German tax law under § 13 UmwStG provides for so-called
“spaltungsgeborene Anteile” the sale of which is taxable even if the interest in the corporation is reduced to
less than 1% due to the spin-off; see above, under C.III.3.a)(iii).
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received by a domestic corporation, whether in the form of dividends or in the form of
capital gains on the sale of such stock, is fully exempt from tax.263 Accordingly, under
German tax law there is no need for rules preventing the conversion of dividends into
capital gains.

4. More complex anti-tax avoidance regime in the U.S.
The anti-tax avoidance regime under § 355 IRC might be characterized by the two
principal concerns it is meant to prevent: (1) the conversion of ordinary dividend income
at the shareholder level into capital gain, and (2) the transfer of appreciated property out
of the corporation without triggering tax on the corporate level. To thwart the taxpayers’
attempts to accomplish such tax avoidance, the spin-off rules provide for a complex
system of codified and judicial requirements. The device clause and the active business
requirement are intended to disallow the conversion of income.264 The provisions of
§ 355 (d) and (e) IRC shall ensure taxation of appreciated property on the corporate
level.265 The continuity of interest requirement can be understood as to prevent either the
bailout of cash266 or the sale to third parties.267 Furthermore, there is the general anti-tax
avoidance approach of the business purpose doctrine.268

263

See above, under C.II.1.

264

Cf. B.III.2.c), d).

265

See B.III.4.a) and b).

266

Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 C.2.

267

Howley, Business Organizations with Tax Planning, Part 23, § 150.06 [2]; Burke, Federal Income
Taxation of Corporations and Stockholders, 5.E., Ch. 10 § 9, at 308. These two goals are not necessary
opposed, since the typical way to facilitate a bailout is to spin-off the appreciated property and then to sale
the stock received to third parties.
268

See B.III.2.e).
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What justifies this rather complicated system of overlapping provisions and rules?
The German Transformation Tax Act by comparison seems rather clear and simple. The
provision of § 15 (3) UmwStG intended to thwart the taxpayers’ attempts to avoid taxes
focuses on the creation of operational units and the sale of such operational units to
outside parties.

The reason for the different approach might be twofold. The German spin-off
rules only deal with the problem of avoiding taxation on the corporate level,269 whereas
the U.S. tax regime in addition shall prevent the conversions of ordinary income into
capital gains. Yet, this cannot explain the fact that the tax regime under § 355 IRC is
based on three rules with respect to the conversion of income,270 three rules regarding the
sale to outside parties271 and an additional general anti-tax avoidance rule. The answer for
this complex set of rules might be simple: “time”. The anti-tax avoidance scheme of
§ 355 IRC has developed over more than 50 years, adding another rule to the system each
time taxpayers were able to find means to get around the existing provisions.272 And as if
this would not be enough, Congress decided to change one of the underlying principles of
the spin-off rules byrepealing the General Utilities doctrine.273 In contrast, § 15
UmwStG was enacted in 1994 and in force since January 1, 1995. It seems that there was
269

Under the German tax regime there are no different rates for the taxation of dividends and the taxation
of gains on the sale of stock; cf. D.I.3.

270

Including the continuity of interest requirement.

271

Again including the continuity of interest requirement.

272

See the brief description by Schler, Simplifying and Rationalizing the Spinoff Rules, 56 SMU L. Rev.
239 (242-244).

273

See above, under B.III.4.
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just not enough time for major changes and amendments to the German Transformation
Tax Act. However, the German Tax Reform 2000 amended the Corporation Tax Act
adding anti- tax avoidance provisions dealing with similar issues as § 15 (3) UmwStG.
These new rules have an overlapping scope as well and seem to match with § 15 (3)
UmwStG even less as the provisions and rules under § 355 IRC.274 It might be just a
question of time until the rules under § 15 UmwStG resemble the ones under § 355 IRC.

5. Carry-over of losses
Under U.S. law tax attributes of the transferor corporation generally do not
carryover, even if the divisive transaction takes the form of a “D reorganization”. Only
the earnings and profits of the distributing corporation are allocated between the
distributing and controlled corporation(s) in proportion to the relative fair market values
of the assets.275 But no capital loss and especially no net operating loss is attributed to the
controlled corporation. In contrast, under German tax law the transferee corporation
(partially) succeeds the transferee corporation in holding periods, depreciation and net
operating loss.276

This different treatment might be explained by taking the general understanding
of the transaction into account. The German Transformation Act defines the general rules
applicable for all reorganizations in the chapter for mergers.277 The rules for spin-off

274

E.g. § 15 (3), sentence 4 UmwStG provides for a five year holding period, § 8b (4) KStG provides for a
seven year holding period.

275

See above, under B.III.3.a), and Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate
Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 D.3.

276

See above, under C.III.3.a)(ii).

277

See §§ 2-122 UmwG.
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transactions refer to these merger rules278 and, accordingly, provide for a (partial)
universal succession. The German Transformation Tax Act follows this corporate law
approach. The spin-off rules in § 15 UmwStG refer to the merger provisions in §§ 11-13
UmwStG for the requirements as well as the consequences of a tax free treatment. Under
the merger provisions succession rules seem appropriate to reflect the termination of the
transferor corporation and the continuity of the trade or business in a new (larger) form.
Accordingly, the transferee corporation (partially) succeeds the transferor corporation in
a spin-off transaction the same way a transferee corporation does in a merger. U.S. tax
law in § 355 IRC (with § 368 IRC) defines rules for a divisive transaction which
resembles a mere distribution of stock. The transferor corporation will generally not
cease to exist. Accordingly, there is less need for attribution rules and legal succession.

II. Proposed changes of the U.S. spin-off rules
Comparing the U.S.with the German spin-off tax regime shows several reasons
for differences. The underlying principles might be different: U.S. tax law called for
higher tax rates on dividends than on capital gains, unlike the German tax law. A tax
system developed and amended over time tends to get more complicated than one which
is newly implemented. This leads to the question: Is there no need for improvement?

Yet, there is an ongoing discussion in the U.S. how to amend the Code to make it
less complicated. Since the spin-off provisions apply overlapping anti-tax avoidance
rules, there is room for change. Furthermore, the underlying principles of the taxation of

278

§ 125 UmwG.
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corporations in the U.S. might have changed. For dividends no longer the tax rates for
ordinary income, but rather the capital gain tax rates apply.

1. Simplification of the U.S. spin-off rules?
The U.S. spin- off rules offer a complex system of codified and judicial requirements aimed to thwart tax avoidance schemes.279 These requirements can be separated
into three groups: (1) provisions to disallow the conversion of ordinary income into
capital gains (device clause and active business requirement), (2) rules to prevent
avoidance of tax at the corporate level (§ 355 (d) and (e) IRC), and (3) general anti-tax
avoidance provisions (continuity of interest requirement and business purpose doctrine).

Ideally, the legislator should aim at achieving all these objectives in the simplest
way possible. Why is one provision for each of the groups not sufficient? And why are
general anti-tax avoidance provisions necessary and applicable, if the Code provides for
special ones designed to meet the concerns? However, it seems difficult to define new
rules without leaving room for tax structures designed to circumvent these provisions.
This seems a common observation of the articles dealing with simplification of the spinoff provisions.280

279

For the following cf. D.I.4.

280

Cf. Schler, Simplifying and Rationalizing the Spinoff Rules, 56 SMU L. Rev. 239 (252), who on the one
hand wants to simplify the spin-off rules, but on the other hand is not willing to draw clear lines because
certain transactions, which today would be disqualified, might get tax free treatment under the new rules.
To put it different, the Schler-proposal reflects all the difficulties and details of the spin-off rules and in
doing this does not solve its own task: to provide for less complex spin-off provisions (cf. Schler’s
summary on page 282/283).
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Considering the rules focusing on the conversion of ordinary income into capital
gains, the device clause covers transactions which are also targeted under the active
business requirement. It seems problematic to utilize the broad device clause, if a transaction meets the elaborate requirements of the active business test.281 The device clause,
due to its broad wording, should step back in such a case, because the requirements of the
more special provision are met. Due to is broad wording the device clause is used as a doit-all provision.282 It seems questionable to provide for such a rule in the Code, which
inevitably needs clarification by the Courts and the Regulations. The same issues could
be addressed with more accurate provisions decided on by the Congress itself (and not
the Treasury).283 And if a transaction is aimed to circumvent the special provisions, there
is still room to utilize a modified business purpose test.284 A transaction would not
qualify for tax free treatment, if there is no business purpose for each of the single steps
of the actual transaction used, even when meeting the requirements of the active business
requirement.

281

Cf. Abrams/Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10.04 (a), at 268/269; Lind/Schwarz/Lathrope/Rosenberg, Fundamentals of Corporate Taxation, 5.E., Ch. 10 C.3.b.

282

See above, under B.III.2.d).

283

The reasons mentioned by Schler, Simplifying and Rationalizing the Spinoff Rules, 56 SMU L. Rev.
239 (254), to retain the device clause seem not convincing. Planned sales of stock after the distribution are
covered by § 355 (d) and (e) IRC. Large amounts of nonbusiness assets in P or S need not be discouraged,
because it is up the corporation and its shareholders (and not to the tax law) whether to retain or distribute
earnings. And the question of a weak business purpose is still part of the inquiry suggested here – therefore
a “backstop” is provided.

284

See also Schler, Simplifying and Rationalizing the Spinoff Rules, 56 SMU L. Rev. 239 (251/252).
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A similar approach seems appropriate with respect to § 355 (d) and (e) IRC. A
combination285 of these provisions should be implemented, triggering tax on the
corporate level, if the distribution is part of a plan according to which more than 50% (or
any other given percentage) of the stock of the distributing or controlled corporation is
sold to third parties.286 A plan might be presumed to exist in certain cases, e.g. if an
acquisition of a particular percentage takes place within a certain time period before or
after the distribution.287 This provision would define a set of disqualified transactions
without being limited to these cases.288 It would be more specific than a general business
purpose test or the continuity of interest requirement. Yet, transactions aimed to meet the
language of the Code, but not its substance, would not qualify.289 A more specific
business purpose test, analyzing each step of the actual transaction, could be employed as
a backstop. Under such a regime the continuity of interest requirement would no longer
appear necessary.290

285

Cf. Yin, Corporate Tax: Taxing Corporate Divisions, 56 SMU L. Rev. 289 (299).

286

See also Yin, Corporate Tax: Taxing Corporate Divisions, 56 SMU L. Rev. 289 (296), who describes
§ 355 (e) IRC as a model for a change of ownership rule which should trigger taxation under the spin-off
provisions.

287

Cf. § 355 (e)(2)(A) and (B) IRC.

288

See the similar approach under § 15 (3), sentence 2-4 UmwStG, which are also limited to trigger tax on
the corporate level.

289

As Yin, Corporate Tax: Taxing Corporate Divisions, 56 SMU L. Rev. 289 (301), points out § 355 (e)
IRC in its current form does not trigger tax on the shareholder level. This would only seem necessary, if the
new change of ownership rule would also be utilized to disallow the conversion of ordinary income into
capital gains; cf. also Schler, Simplifying and Rationalizing the Spinoff Rules, 56 SMU L. Rev. 239
(285/286). Such a broad approach might not be necessary for different reasons, see below, under D.II.2.

290

Cf. also Burke, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Stockholders, 5.E., Ch. 10 § 9, at page
310, which wants to utilize § 355 (e) IRC and the device clause to fully replace the continuity of interest
requirement.

* The author is German Certified Tax Consultant and admitted to Bar in Stuttgart.

Page 65
In conclusion, it seems questionable thatthe current an ti-tax avoidance regime
under § 355 IRC is the only possible or even the best solution. Yet, since this complicated
set of rules has been in place for a long time, a change is unlikely.291

2. Is conversion of dividends into capital gains still tax avoidance?
In the past, the Code provided for different tax rates on ordinary income and
capital gains.292 The rates on capital gains under § 1 (h) IRC were typically lower than
the ordinary tax rates for individuals. Consequently, income was subject to higher tax
rates if treated as dividend rather than as capital gain. The taxpayers were encouraged to
convert ordinary income into capital gains. Corporations would not distribute any
dividends to allow the shareholder to realize retained earnings by means of selling the
stock. Under the spin-off rules, a corporation was able to transfer cash or liquid assets to
its shareholders without triggering dividend treatment on the shareholder level by
forming a new subsidiary and spinning off its stock. In a second step the shareholders
would sell the stock, thereby realizing the value of the underlying liquid assets subject
only to capital gains treatment. Several of the anti-tax avoidance provisions under § 355
IRC (e.g. device clause and active business requirement) are aimed to deal with this
issue.293

291

Yin, Corporate Tax: Taxing Corporate Divisions, 56 SMU L. Rev. 289 (290); Schler, Simplifying and
Rationalizing the Spinoff Rules, 56 SMU L. Rev. 239 (285).
292

However, between 1987 and 1990 the tax rates were the same. This is still true for corporations the
capital gain tax rates of which were not lowered in 1990; cf. Klein/Bankman/Shaviro, Federal Income
Taxation, 13.E., Ch. 1 G.2.; Burke, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Stockholders, 5.E., Ch. 2
§ 2, at page 26.
293

See above, under D.II.1.
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Since 2003, the tax rate for dividends has been significantly lowered for individual taxpayers. Qualified dividends received by individual294 shareholders are taxed at
the same rates that apply to net capital gain.295 This will clearly decrease the advantages
of utilizing spin-off transactions to convert ordinary income into capital gains. Instead of
spinning off the cash via a new formed subsidiary to realize the value by selling the stock
of the transferee subsidiary, the transferor corporation could just pay a dividend to its
shareholders. The situation is similar to the tax environment in Germany. In the future,
new acquisition structures might be advisable. Instead of spinning off a business with
appreciated property and then selling the stock of the newly created subsidiary to the
acquirer, the transferor corporation might sell the business to an Acquisition NewCo and
then distribute the gain realized to its shareholders. The income realized by the transferor
corporation can be offset by carryover losses or at least by a higher purchase price the
acquirer is willing to pay since he will get a step-up in basis.

Consequently, there should be less concern about the conversion of ordinary
income into capital gains. The anti-tax avoidance rules under § 355 IRC aimed to deal
with this issue might be outdated soon, provided the U.S. legislation will retain the
parallel treatment of dividends and capital gains on the sale of stock or – as in
Germany296 – generally end the differentiation between tax rates for ordinary income and

294

Corporations are subject to the same tax rates on dividends and capital gains anyway, cf. § 1201 (a) IRC.

295

See new § 1 (h)(11) IRC, enacted by Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, May 28,
2003. The Act also provides for a sunset provision according to which the reduced tax rates expire, and
regular tax rates apply to tax years beginning after December 31, 2008; cf. B.II.1.

296

The German tax regime provides relief from taxation on capital gains only for small individual investors
(less than 1% ownership) which are not in a position to avoid taxes by structuring spin-off transactions; see
above, under D.I.3.
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capital gains. By repealing the anti-bailout provisions a significant simplification of the
tax regime for spin-off could be achieved.

E. Conclusion
The tax law in the U.S. and Germany offers special provisions dealing with
divisive transactions commonly referred to as “spin-off”. Under the U.S. tax regime
§ 355 IRC deals with the distribution of stock and securities of a controlled corporation.
If the requirements are met, the Code allows tax free treatment on corporate as well as
shareholder level. Under German tax law, § 15 German Transformation Tax Act
(“Umwandlungssteuergesetz” – UmwStG) establishes a tax regime for divisive
transactions. If the requirements of §§ 15 and 11 UmwStG are met, the transaction is tax
free on corporate and shareholder level.

These rules provide for quite similar treatments of divisive transactions. Both
jurisdictions allow a divisive transaction only for separating active business units. Both
jurisdictions assure future taxation by means of a basis carry-over. And both tax regimes
provide for a deferral in taxes, not an exemption.

Nonetheless, there aresignificant differences especially with respect to the antitax avoidance provisions. The U.S. spin-off rules provide for a complex system of
codified and judicial requirements which seek to (1) disallow the conversion of ordinary
income into capital gains, and (2) prevent avoidance of tax at the corporate level. It seems
advisable to tighten this regime by providing only one provision (instead of two or three
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overlapping ones) for each of these objectives. Furthermore, the conversion of ordinary
income into capital gains might no longer be an issue, since – starting in 2003 –
dividends are taxed at the same tax rates as capital gains both for individual and corporate
shareholders.

__
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